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ABSTRACT  
 
As technology continues to evolve, interactions between humans 
and artificial intelligence (“AI”) will skyrocket. It is important to 
understand the impact AI can have on society, as well as the 
potential harm and subsequent liability that could result, and to 
develop best practices designed to address them. The U.S. needs a 
comprehensive framework to govern the design, creation, use and 
risks associated with AI. At the time of this writing, no such 
framework has been implemented.  
This article takes a socio-legal, interdisciplinary approach to 
explore ideas on socio-ethical concerns and theories of liability 
related to AI, and applies a sociological perspective to assess 
existing legal frameworks that currently govern human-AI 
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interaction. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this article 
seeks to encourage holistic and robust dialogue about how AI could 
be developed and operated, hoping that humans and AI can coexist 
harmoniously. It also proposes a framework to regulate such 
development in the U.S. 
There are a few limitations in this article. First, due to the 
accelerated pace of technological change, the future state of AI will 
be different from the current state. Hence, the framework proposed 
in this article might eventually become obsolete. Second, this article 
is derived from secondary sources and, although the information 
collected includes rich empirical data, no primary data was 
generated other than the authors’ views. Third, only specific aspects 
of AI were selected for analysis – there are other factors in policy, 
sociology and law that are not addressed. Lastly, this article is 
primarily focused on Western cultures, North America and Europe 
in particular; hence, it might not be applicable globally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Some believe that, in ten to twenty years, human intelligence and 
artificial intelligence will be equal. 1  According to futurist Ray 
Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns, by the year 2045, 
superintelligence, capable of self-improvement, will cause an 
intelligence explosion or “technological singularity” superior to 
human intelligence. Under this theory, AI will be autonomous and 
able to act independent from the will of humanity.2  
As Germany’s Ethics Commission for Automated and 
Connected Driving (2016) stated, a primary question to ask as we 
move into the future of AI is: “[w]hat technological development 
guidelines are required to ensure that we do not blur the contours of 
a human society that places individuals, their freedom of 
development, their physical and intellectual integrity and their 
entitlement to social respect at the heart of its legal regime?”3 This 
question requires holistic assessment from both a sociological and 
legal perspective. Accordingly, this article explores the relationship 
between human beings and AI, and the laws that govern their 
interactions. This article first examines how humans interact with 
                                                                                                             
1 See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN 
COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 40-47 (1999). 
2 Paulius Čerka et al., Liability for Damages Caused by Artificial 
Intelligence, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 376, 382 (2015) (citing Ray 
Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns (Mar. 7, 2001), 
http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns). 
3 FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 
ETHICS COMMISSION: AUTOMATED AND CONNECTED DRIVING (2017). 
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AI, and in particular, with Socially Assistive Robotics. Next, this 
article examines ethical and moral concerns surrounding human-AI 
interactions. Third, this article seeks to understand whether a 
sufficient legal and regulatory environment capable of governing 
human-AI interaction exists. Finally, this article proposes a moral 
and legal framework to guide AI development.  
 
 
I.   BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Definitions of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
 
The definition of AI is a work in progress as there is no 
universally accepted definition. 4  For example, MIT Professor 
Patrick Winston defined AI as “the study of computations that make 
it possible to perceive, reason and act.”5 In a later lecture, Winston 
further described AI as “algorithms or procedures enabled by 
constraints exposed by representations modeled and targeted at 
thinking, perception and action.”6 Technology analysts for Deloitte 
Consulting define AI as  “the theory and development of computer 
systems able to perform tasks that normally require human 
intelligence.”7 Under all three definitions, AI is targeted at helping 
machines to think and act like humans.  
“Machine learning,” a related piece of the AI puzzle, was coined 
by Arthur Samuel in 1959 as “a field of study that gives computers 
the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed.”8 Tom 
                                                                                                             
4 See Jeff Leek, What is artificial intelligence? A three part definition, 
SIMPLYSTATS (Jan. 19, 2017), https://simplystatistics.org/2017/01/19/what-is-
artificial-intelligence/. 
5 PATRICK WINSTON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 5 (3d ed.1992).  
6 Patrick Winston, Lecture 1: Introduction and Scope, MIT 
OPENCOURSEWARE, https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-and-
computer-science/6-034-artificial-intelligence-fall-2010/lecture-videos/lecture-
1-introduction-and-scope/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2017). 
7 DAVID SCHATSKY ET AL. Cognitive Technologies: The Real Opportunities 
for Business, DELOITTE REVIEW ISSUE 16 (Jan. 26, 2015), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/deloitte-review/issue-16/cognitive-
technologies-business-applications.html. 
8 MARIETTE AWAD & RAHUL KHANNA, EFFICIENT LEARNING MACHINES 
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Mitchell later proposed a more precise definition in 1998 as “a 
computer program that is said to learn from experience ‘E’ with 
respect to some class of tasks ‘T’ and performance measure ‘P’, if 
its performance at tasks in ‘T’, as measured by ‘P’, improves with 
experience ‘E’.”9 Machine learning is then an application of AI that 
focuses on the ability of machines to self-learn and improve either 
from direct experience or instruction. Its goal is to allow machines 
to learn without human intervention and ultimately enable 
autonomy. 10 
This article refers to all AI enhanced robots, AI programs, and 
machine learning supported technology as “machines” or “AI” 
interchangeably. It analyzes human-machine interaction through a 
sociological lens because sociology is “the study of the 
development, structure, and functioning of human society.”11 From 
that perspective, we define machines and AI as embodied and 
disembodied autonomous actors able to perform human actions that 
normally require human intelligence, learn without human 
intervention and interact directly with humans in natural 
environments.  
It is worth noting that the meaning of “AI” evolves over time 
because AI is constantly changing.12 Once something is done, it 
becomes commonplace and is no longer referred to as AI. Carlos 
Guestrin, an expert in machine learning, stated in an interview 
regarding this so-called AI effect: “It's a perceptual thing—once 
something becomes commonplace, it's demystified, and it doesn't 
                                                                                                             
THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND APPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERS AND SYSTEM 
DESIGNERS (2015), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5990-9_1. 
9 TOM MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2, (1997).  
10 Rob Schapire, COS 511: Theoretical Machine Learning Lecture #1, 
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (Feb. 4, 2008), 
https://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr08/cos511/scribe_notes/0204.p
df. 
11  Sociology, OXFORD DICTIONARY, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sociology (last visited Dec. 15, 
2018). 
12 PAMELA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK: A PERSONAL INQUIRY 
INTO THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE xiii (2d ed. 
2004). 
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feel like the magical intelligence that we see in humans.”13 
B.  What is the State of Machines Today? 
 
Machines have been around since the 1950s, so what makes this 
topic so important today? There are six key factors driving change: 
 
1. Computing Power and Moore’s Law 
 
Coined by Intel-cofounder Gordon Moore in 1965, Moore’s 
Law stands for the premise that computing power will double every 
year.14 Empirical observations tend to support Moore’s Law—new 
machines are significantly more powerful and less costly than their 
predecessors. 15  In fact, the world’s fastest supercomputer has 
already surpassed human memory capacity and processing power 
for certain kinds of information 16  and the current generation of 
computer microprocessors (the mechanisms that determine 
computing power) provide four million times the performance of the 
first microprocessors made in 1971.17 
 
2. Big Data and Big Knowledge  
 
Machines depend on data analysis to determine how to 
                                                                                                             
13 Guia Marie Del Prado, This Phenomenon Explains What Everyone Gets 
Wrong About AI, (Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/misconception-artificial-intelligene-2015-10. 
14 Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 
86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 82–85 (1998), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/658762.  
15 Mark J. Perry, Technology has advanced so rapidly that a laptop computer 
today is 96% cheaper than a 1994 model and 1,000X better, AEIDEAS (May 25, 
2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/technology-has-advanced-so-rapidly-that-
a-laptop-computer-today-is-96-cheaper-than-a-1994-model-and-1000x-better/; 
see also Tim Cross, Vanishing point: the rise of the invisible computer, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/jan/26/vanishing-point-rise-invisible-computer.  
16 Marki Fischetti, Computers versus Brains, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 1, 
2011) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/computers-vs-brains/. 
17 After Moore’s Law, THE ECONOMIST: TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY (Mar. 12, 
2016), https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2016-03-12/after-
moores-law. 
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“think” and what corresponding actions to take.18  Due to social 
media, the internet and smart phones, the amount of data available 
for analysis continues to grow exponentially. For example, ninety 
percent of the data in the world today was created in the last two 
years and the current global output of data is roughly 2.5 quintillion 
bytes per day.19 As the world steadily becomes more connected with 
an ever-increasing number of electronic devices, the amount of data 
generated will continue to grow. In addition to data, as of 2013, the 
level of human knowledge was doubling every 13 months and will 
eventually double every 12 hours.20  
 
3. The Internet and the Cloud 
 
The internet and cloud computing make vast amounts of data 
and information immediately available to average users. 21  The 
global internet population has grown by more than 60% since 2010, 
and as of 2014, there were more mobile devices on the planet than 
people. 22  Mobile devices alone generate more than 18 million 
megabytes of data every minute in the U.S.23  
 
                                                                                                             
18 See Peter Stone et al., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY, 8-17 (Sept. 2016), 
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf 
(stating that advances in large scale information gathering and processing have 
fueled the AI revolution). 
19 Tom Hale, How Much Data Does the World Generate Every Minute?, IFL 
SCIENCE! (July 26, 2017), http://www.iflscience.com/technology/how-much-
data-does-the-world-generate-every-minute/. 
20 David R. Schilling, Knowledge Doubling Every 12 Months, Soon to be 
Every 12 Hours, INDUSTRY TAP (Apr. 19, 2013) 
http://www.industrytap.com/knowledge-doubling-every-12-months-soon-to-be-
every-12-hours/3950 (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
21 Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation Of 'The Internet Of Things', FORBES 
(May 13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-
explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#6c221251d091. 
22 Eric Mack, There Are Now More Gadgets on Earth Than People, CNET 
(Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.cnet.com/news/there-are-now-more-gadgets-on-
earth-than-people/. 
23 See Josh James, Data Never Sleeps 4.0, DOMO (Jun. 28, 2016), 
https://www.domo.com/blog/data-never-sleeps-4-0/.  
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4. New Algorithms  
 
This level of connectedness allows humans to collaborate 
and develop AI in ways not previously available.24 All of the above 
factors have contributed to the development of new algorithms, such 
as those leveraged in OpenAI’s Hindsight Experience Replay, 
which allows machines to mimic the way that humans learn when 
trying to master a new skill.25 
 
5. Technology Companies with Big Capital   
 
According to Farhad Manjoo, the big five technology giants 
(Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft) are the most 
influential leaders in AI development. 26  They also happen to 
represent some of the most well-capitalized companies in history. 
Apple and Amazon both reached one trillion dollar valuations in 
2018,27 making them the largest companies on earth by market value 
with a combined value greater than the United Kingdom’s gross 
domestic product. 28  Manjoo recently stated that the big five 
technology giants have “become more like governments than 
companies with the amount of money they have [and] the kind of 
                                                                                                             
24 The 3 Forces that Brought AI to Life (And Why it’s Only Now Changing 
the World), THE CLOUDFACTORY BLOG (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://blog.cloudfactory.com/3-forces-brought-ai-to-life.  
25 Marcin Andrychowicz et al., Hindsight Experience Replay,  ADVANCES IN 
NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 30 (2017), 
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7090-hindsight-experience-replay. 
26  How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like Governments Than 
Companies, NPR (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-have-become-
more-like-governments-than-companies. 
27 David Streitfeld, Amazon Hits $1,000,000,000,000 in Value, Following 
Apple, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/amazon-stock-price-1-trillion-
value.html. 
28  Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Alphabet, and Microsoft Are Collectively 
Worth More Than the Entire Economy of the United Kingdom, INC.COM, (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://www.inc.com/associated-press/mindblowing-facts-tech-
industry-money-amazon-apple-microsoft-facebook-alphabet.html. 
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power they have over democracy in society.”29 These companies are 
joining forces to accelerate the pace of AI development.30   
6. Government-backed AI Development   
 
The Chinese government announced its intention to become 
a principal player in AI innovation by the year 2030, but it is not the 
only player in town.31 Although private companies are the primary 
drivers for AI innovation in the U.S., the U.S. Department of 
Defense activated the Artificial Intelligence Exploration program, 
which is designed to ensure that the U.S. maintains an advantage in 
AI development. 32   Japan’s government released its Artificial 
Intelligence Technology Strategy in 2017, focusing on AI utilization 
and application, public use and connectivity. 33  South Korea, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, 
Estonia, Finland, Poland, Singapore, Malaysia Australia, India, 
Italy, Canada, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates are all 
investing in AI development.34 
 
II. AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: HUMANS AND MACHINES 
 
Over time, the six factors described above will enable machines 
to act more like humans and better engage in traditional human-
human interaction. This will increase human-AI interconnectivity 
resulting in some of the positive sociological impacts and potential 
                                                                                                             
29 NPR, supra note 26.  
30 Romain Dillet, Apple joins Amazon, Facebook, Google, IBM and Microsoft 
in AI Initiative, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/27/apple-joins-amazon-facebook-google-ibm-
and-microsoft-in-ai-initiative/. 
31  Associated Press, China Announces Goal of Leadership in Artificial 
Intelligence by 2030, CBS NEWS (July 21, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-announces-goal-of-leadership-in-
artificial-intelligence-by-2030/. 
32 Accelerating the Exploration of Promising Artificial Intelligence Concepts, 
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-07-20a. 
33 Kathleen Walch, The Race for AI Dominance is More Global Than You 
Think, MEDIUM (Aug. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/cognilytica/the-race-for-ai-
dominance-is-more-global-than-you-think-e01a0c34d64e. 
34 Id. 
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threats described next. By way of example, we will assess the 
impacts and threats associated with Socially Assistive Robots 
(“SARs”). 
 
A.  Positive Social Impacts 
 
SARs are an example of current human-AI interconnectivity. 
SARs provide technical, emotional and communal support to human 
users through social interaction. 35  SARs aim to provide direct 
assistance to people in generalized settings like homes, schools and 
hospitals. 36  According to The Social Robotics Lab at Yale 
University, SARs can learn, recognize and respond to human social 
cues. In doing so, SARs can enhance social, emotional, and 
cognitive growth in humans, specifically children with social and 
cognitive disabilities.37  
The utility of SARs can be assessed through two of the three 
major schools of sociological thought: Functionalist Theory and 
Conflict Theory.  Functionalist Theory defines society as a system 
of interrelated and interdependent parts working together to 
maintain order and stability.38  Conflict Theory defines society as a 
place of inequality that generates conflict and social change.39  
From the Functionalist perspective, SARs have at least three 
positive functions. First, SARs establish effective interaction with 
human users with an aim to assist and achieve measurable outcomes 
in therapy, rehabilitation and education. For example, SARs support 
the learning process of children with learning disabilities. 40 
Preliminary studies suggest that robots may act as gratifying social 
                                                                                                             
35 David Feil-Seifer & Maja Mataric, Defining Socially Assistive Robotics, 
9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REHABILITATION ROBOTICS, 465–68 
(2005). 
36 Id. 
       37  “Socially Assistive Robots”: An NSF Expedition in Computing, YALE 
UNIVERSITY, http://robotshelpingkids.yale.edu/overview (last visited Jan. 19, 
2018). 
38  JOAN FERRANTE, SOCIOLOGY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 26-27 (9th ed. 
2015). 
39 Id. at 30. 
40 YALE UNIVERSITY, supra note 37.  
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partners for children with autism spectrum disorders. 41  Second, 
SARs reduce caregiver burnout by providing assistive care to the 
physically disabled, convalescent patients and the elderly.42 Third, 
combat SARs are used on battlefields to reduce human combat error 
and human casualties.43   
At the time of this writing, SARs are already quite advance. 
Sophia is the latest and most prominent SAR. Activated in 2015, 
Sophia is a social-humanoid machine developed by Hong Kong-
based company Hanson Robotics.44 Sophia can walk, talk and make 
sixty-two different facial expressions.45 She has appeared in various 
forms of media, engaged in high-profile interviews and participated 
in trade shows around the world.46 Despite Sophia’s popularity, not 
everyone is a fan. For example, Facebook’s director of AI research, 
Yan LeCun, tweeted: “[Sophia] is to AI as prestidigitation is to real 
magic. Perhaps we should call this ‘Cargo Cult AI’ or ‘Potemkin 
AI’ or ‘Wizard-of-Oz AI.’” 47  LeCun did not elaborate but his 
criticism suggests that Sophia is just another robot with no 
comprehension of what it is doing.  
 
B.  Potential Threats  
 
                                                                                                             
41  David Feil-Seifer, Towards Spatial Methods for Socially Assistive 
Robotics: Validation with Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders, TWENTY-
SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
(2011). 
42 FEIL-SEIFER & MATARIC, supra note 35. 
43 Peter Ray Allison., What Does a Bomb Disposal Robot Actually Do?, BBC 
NEWS (July 15, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160714-what-does-a-
bomb-disposal-robot-actually-do. 
44  Hi, I am Sophia…, HANSON ROBOTICS (last visited Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.hansonrobotics.com/sophia/. 
45 Harriet Taylor, Could You Fall in Love with This Robot?, CNBC (Mar. 16, 
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/16/could-you-fall-in-love-with-this-
robot.html.  
46 CNBC, Interview with The Lifelike Hot Robot Named Sophia (Full), 
YOUTUBE, (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5t6K9iwcdw. 
47 Shona Ghosh, Facebook's AI boss described Sophia the robot as 'complete 
b------t' and 'Wizard-of-Oz AI’, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Jan. 6, 2018), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-ai-yann-lecun-sophia-robot-bullshit-
2018-1. 
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1. Human-Machine Digital Divide 
 
The Conflict perspective predicts that the introduction of SARs 
will usher in a new digital divide (i.e., human-machine divide), 
separating the haves from the have-nots. Accordingly, the gap will 
increase between the advantaged population with the capital to 
acquire SARs and the disadvantaged population with limited 
financial resources.48 For example, although robot-assisted surgery 
is becoming more common, it is still fairly expensive and not 
everyone can afford it.49 This divide is predicted to occur on a global 
scale, dividing the richest countries from the poorest countries, 
further broadening the inequality gap.50  
The Conflict perspective also views any apparent altruistic 
motives, such as developing SARs to assist children with autism, as 
a façade to cover up profit-driven motives.51 Conflict theorists argue 
that companies are driven by a desire to maximize profits by 
reducing manpower and its associated costs, leading to increased 
unemployment. 
 
2. Human-Machine Intimacy and Social Isolation 
 
Frequent and intimate interactions between humans and 
machines may result in social isolation.  Companies like Realbotix 
have created silicone sex machines that bring recent Hollywood 
movies like “Her” and “Ex Machina” to life.52 Realbotix produces 
both male and female robots, which come with dozens of 
interchangeable parts, allowing users to alter everything from eye 
and hair color to the size and shape of robots’ sexual organs.53 While 
                                                                                                             
48 JOAN FERRANTE, SEEING SOCIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 28 (3d ed. 2016). 
49  Gina Kolata, Results Unproven, Robotic Surgery Wins Converts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/health/14robot.html. 
50 FERRANTE, supra note 48, at 28. 
51 FERRANTE, supra note 38, at 30. 
52 HER (ANNAPURNA PICTURES 2013); EX MACHINA (FILM4, DNA FILMS 
2014). 
53 Jon Rogers, Meet ‘Robohunk’ – The £11k 6ft hunky sex doll with rippling 
muscles and a British accent, THE SUN (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5666789/sex-doll-robohunk-rippling-muscles-
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some support this trend, arguing that sex machines will provide 
companionship, and minimize crime rates and human-human 
infidelity, critics point out that use of sex machines raises social and 
ethical issues like obsession and overdependence.54  
 
3. Machine Social Bias and Hacking 
 
A recent study, wherein Boston University and Microsoft 
Research New England used word embeddings to train a machine to 
handle language, revealed that machines can learn gender bias.55 
Word embeddings result from letting AI draw connections between 
words found in phrases from huge data sets, like Word2Vec, an 
aggregated data set compiled from Google News. 56  Developers 
typically use word embeddings to train “chatbots, translation 
systems, image-captioning programs, and recommendation 
algorithms.” 57  This process allows machines to make semantic 
connections between words like “king” and “queen” and understand 
that their relationship is similar to the relationship between the 
words “man” and “woman.” In the above study, this seemingly 
benign training resulted in something disturbing—the machine 
ultimately concluded that the word “programmer” was closer to the 
word “man” than “woman,” and that the most similar word for 
“woman” was “homemaker.”58 
According to a joint research project by Google, OpenAI, 
Stanford University and UC Berkeley, this type of gender bias is not 
the only risk in machine development. 59  Additional problems 
                                                                                                             
british-accent-11k/. 
54 FRR Report: Our Sexual Future with Robots, RESPONSIBLE ROBOTICS. 
(July 5, 2017), https://responsiblerobotics.org/2017/07/05/frr-report-our-sexual-
future-with-robots/.  
55 Will Knight, How to Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms, MIT 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Nov. 23, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-
algorithms/. 
56 Rich Barlow, Is Your Computer Sexist?, BU TODAY (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.bu.edu/today/2016/sexist-computer/. 
57 Id. 
58 Knight, supra note 55. 
59 Dario Amodei et al., Concrete Problems in AI Safety, CORNELL U. LIBR., 
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include negative side effects, 60  reward hacking 61  and scalable 
oversight. 62  As a result, Dario Amodei suggests developing a 
principled, forward-looking and universal approach to AI 
development “that continues to remain relevant as autonomous 
systems become more powerful.”63 
  
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY TO ADDRESS HARM INVOLVING AI 
 
As theories of legal liability reflect a civilization’s social goals, 
this article next considers theories of liability available to address 
risk and harm resulting from human-AI interaction. The following 
explores statutory and common law theories of liability for harm that 
results from human-machine interaction. 
 
A.  Statutes and Regulations 
 
At the time of this writing, no comprehensive statutory scheme 
exists in the U.S. to address human-machine risk and liability.  
However, Congress has introduced several related bills that seem to 
move in that direction.64 For example, in December 2017, the House 
of Representatives introduced the Fundamentally Understanding the 
Usability and Realistic Evolution of Artificial Intelligence Act of 
                                                                                                             
https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06565 (last revised July 25, 2016).  
60 Negative side effects occur when the designer creates an objective function 
for the machine that focuses on achieving a specific objective in its target 
environment but ignores other aspects of the environment–implicitly expressing 
indifference to other environmental variables and the objective functions’ impact 
on them, ultimately resulting in harm.  
61 Reward hacking occurs when the objective function allows for some 
clever, easy solution that maximizes the machine’s ability to achieve the objective 
function but perverts the spirit of the designer's intent (i.e., the objective function 
can be gamed). 
62 Scalable oversight means that it is too expensive to implement and monitor 
detailed and frequent controls in the development process, which leads to bad 
machine interpretation of limited training data samples.  
63 Amodei, supra note 59, at 21. 
64  Christopher Fonzone, What Congress’s First Steps into AI Legislation 
Portend, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 15, 2018), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/what-congresss-first-
steps-into-ai-legislation-portend/. 
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2017 (“FUTURE of AI Act”),65 which requires the Department of 
Commerce to establish the Federal Advisory Committee on the 
Development and Implementation of Artificial Intelligence.66 The 
Committee would consider, among other things: a) accountability 
and legal rights associated with AI; b) AI’s impact on the U.S. 
workforce; c) whether and how to incorporate ethical standards into 
AI development; d) machine learning bias injected through cultural 
and societal norms; and e) U.S. competitiveness in the global AI 
market.67 In January 2018, Congress also introduced the A.I. JOBS 
Act of 2018, which would require the U.S. Secretary of Labor to 
develop an industry report outlining the impact that AI will have on 
the U.S. workforce.68  
In light of advanced cybersecurity technology and associated 
risk, the federal government has also taken a stronger stance on 
holding manufacturers accountable for failing to reasonably secure 
their products.69 Most recently, the Federal Trade Commission filed 
a complaint against D-Link Corporation for allegedly preventable 
vulnerabilities in its routers and internet cameras.70    
Several U.S. states have taken steps to legislate use of 
autonomous vehicles, despite cautions that states should avoid 
developing independent regimes to avoid a patchwork of laws.71 For 
                                                                                                             
65 The FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017 was introduced jointly 
as S. 2217 and H.R. 4625 on December 12, 2017 and referred to the Committees 
on Energy and Commerce, Science, Space, and Technology, Education and the 
Workforce, Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, and Oversight and Government 
Reform. On December 15, 2017, it was referred to the Subcommittee on Digital 
Commerce and Consumer Protection. 
66 See FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act, S. 2217, 115th Cong. (2017-
2018); FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act, H.R. 4625, 115th Cong. (2017-
2018). 
67 Id. 
68 See AI JOBS Act of 2018, H.R. 4829, 115th Cong. (2018).  
69 See Enforcing Privacy Promises, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-
privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises (last visited Apr. 8, 2018). 
70 FTC Charges D-Link Put Consumers’ Privacy at Risk Due to the 
Inadequate Security of Its Computer Routers and Cameras, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-d-link-put-consumers-privacy-risk-due-inadequate. 
71 Johana Bhuiyan, Michigan just became the first state to pass 
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example, in anticipation of autonomous rideshare fleets by 
companies like Uber and Lyft, Michigan’s autonomous vehicle 
(“AV”) law specifically regulates AV ride-share networks. 72 
Anticipating the impact that technology companies will have on the 
AV industry, Michigan fashioned the statute’s liability rules to: 1) 
qualify machines as “drivers” for purposes of assigning 
responsibility for accidents, 2) define liability for technology 
companies that supply AV software, and 3) insulate car 
manufacturers from liability except where the damage was caused 
by a defect that existed when the vehicle was originally 
manufactured and before its conversion to AV. 73  The statute is 
instructive as to how future legislation may allocate risk for 
accidents involving machines.  
Overall, AV regulation seems to be the most developed example 
of AI regulation in the U.S. This is probably the case because the 
AV market represents a perfect storm of viable technology, market 
readiness, risk to human life and potential sweeping change to the 
way humans travel. The implication for other AI regulation is that 
market readiness and commercial opportunity will drive AI 
legislation.74  
If that pattern of market-driven regulation persists, common law 
will be the primary mechanism for addressing human-machine 
liability – at least until legislators react to the market. Following that 
                                                                                                             
comprehensive self-driving regulations, RECODE (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.recode.net/2016/12/9/13890080/michigan-dot-self-driving-cars-
laws-automakers. 
72 See Ryan Felton, GM Aims To Get Ahead Of Everyone With Autonomous 
Ride-Sharing Service In Multiple Cities By 2019, JALOPNIK (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://jalopnik.com/gm-aims-to-get-ahead-of-everyone-with-autonomous-ride-
s-1820886131; see also Mike Isaac, Lyft and Waymo Reach Deal to Collaborate 
on Self-Driving Cars, NY TIMES (May 14, 2017); see also Chloe Aiello, Toyota 
shows off its futuristic self-driving store, the 'e-Palette,' at CES, CNBC (Jan. 8, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/08/toyota-unveils-e-palette-at-ces.html. 
73 S. FISCAL AGENCY, S.B. 996-F, (Mich. 2016). 
74 Of note is the existence of international standards that could be used to 
guide liability like ISO 10218-1:2011 (Robots and robotic devices -- Safety 
requirements for industrial robots -- Part 1: Robots) and Article 12 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (stating that a person “on whose behalf a computer was programmed 
should ultimately be responsible for any message generated by the machine.”). 
 
16
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol14/iss1/4
2018]  BLAME IT ON THE MACHINE 65 
logic, the next section describes certain theories of common law 
liability and their limitations. 
 
B.  Common Law 
 
Physical harm caused by machines is not a novel issue for courts 
to address. The Therac-25 case involved at least six accidents 
between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive 
overdoses of radiation resulting in two deaths and four serious 
injuries.75 Issues arose due to scalable oversight, lack of proper bug 
fixing and replacing humans with machine automation for safety-
critical systems function.76 
However, courts have also absolved companies from liability for 
harm that their technology caused. For example, in 1986, a federal 
court held that Apple could not be sued for bugs in its software, 
having disclaimed liability after making no claim that its code was 
bug-free. 77  Since that time, many courts have held similarly, 
including in a large consumer class action case in California against 
Microsoft for software riddled with flaws and bugs.78  
Accordingly, in the current U.S. legal environment, parties 
seeking recovery for harm suffered at the hands of machines face 
several limitations in theories of contract and tort liability.  
 
1. Limitations on Contract Liability  
 
On its face, the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provides 
great protection for parties that suffer harm from a purchased 
product. Sellers create express warranties or promises when they 
affirm facts or make promises about a product, provide a description 
of what the product is or can do, or provide a sample or model which 
                                                                                                             
75 NANCY LEVESON, SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND COMPUTERS, 
APPENDIX A 9-44 (1995). 
76 Id. at 44-49. 
77 Paul Rosenzweig, Bad Code Is Already a Problem. Soon, Companies Will 
Be Liable, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (July 28, 2017), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/28/bad-code-is-already-a-problem-soon-
companies-will-be-liable/. 
78 Id. 
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relates to the product that becomes part of the basis for the bargain.79 
In addition to express warranties, sellers can make and be bound by 
implied warranties like the warranty that products conform to an 
ordinary buyer’s expectations for products of that kind (i.e., the 
implied warranty of merchantability), 80  and the warranty that 
products are fit for the specific purpose for which they were sold 
(i.e., the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).”81   
If a product fails to satisfy a seller’s express or implied 
warranties, buyers injured by that failure may sue for damages. 
Damages include rights to recover for both direct and indirect harm. 
For example, U.C.C. § 2-715 allows plaintiffs to recover costs 
reasonably incurred as a direct result of the breach.82  The same 
section extends to consequential damages, which cover injury to 
person or property proximately or indirectly resulting from any 
breach of warranty.83 
Unfortunately, the likelihood of an injured party recovering 
significant damages for breach of warranty is quite low because 
sophisticated companies typically limit their risk exposure by using 
warranty disclaimers and limitations on liability. 84 These warranty 
disclaimers and limited liability provisions are valid so long as 
certain conditions are met.85 For example, Apple’s iPhone consumer 
warranty limits an injured party’s recovery period to one year from 
the date of purchase; disclaims all warranties, either express or 
                                                                                                             
79 See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
80 See U.C.C. § 2-313 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
81 See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
82 U.C.C. § 2-715 (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (incidental damages include 
“expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and 
custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, 
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other 
reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.”). 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., Samsung Exploding Phone Lawsuits may be Derailed by Fine 
Print, CBS NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/samsung-
galaxy-note-7-fine-print-class-action-waiver-lawsuits/, (providing links to terms 
and conditions for over thirty major technology brands). 
85 U.C.C.  § 2-316 requires that implied warranty disclaimers, if in writing, 
be conspicuous and, as to the merchantability disclaimer, mention the term 
“merchantability”. U.C.C.  § 2-719 allows sellers to limit buyer’s remedies for 
breach of warranty to repair and replacement, excluding all other remedies. 
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implied, except for its One-Year Warranty; and limits recovery 
under its One-Year Warranty to product repair, replacement, 
exchange or refund.86 In Davidson v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-
4942-LHK, 2017 WL 3149305, 19-26 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017), the 
U.S. District Court for Northern California held that Apple’s limited 
recovery period, disclaimers and limited remedy were all 
enforceable.  
Courts typically enforce such provisions. For example, in Puget 
Sound Financial, L.L.C. v. Unisearch, Inc., 146 Wash. 2d 428, 47 
P.3d 940 (2002) the Washington Supreme Court found a limitation 
of liability clause between two parties valid and opined that such 
clauses should generally be held valid unless they can be proven 
unconscionable.87  
Thus, despite the UCC’s protective potential, AI developers will 
render it virtually meaningless through disclaimers and limitations 
of liability. 
 
2. Limitations on Tort Liability 
 
To the extent not prohibited by the Economic Loss Rule88, an 
                                                                                                             
86 Your Hardware Warranty: March 28, 2013—Present, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/legal/warranty/products/ipad-english.html (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2018). 
87 CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 
15:45 (2017); Unconscionability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see 
also EV. ODE ASH. NN.§ .2-719 (“[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury 
to the person in the case of goods purchased primarily for personal, family or 
household use or of any services related thereto is invalid unless it is proved that 
the limitation is not unconscionable”);United Van Lines v. Hertz Penske Truck 
Leasing, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (describing factors weighing 
into a determination of unconscionability to include whether each party has a 
reasonable opportunity to understand the contract terms, whether the contract 
terms were conspicuous, the prior course of dealings between the parties, and the 
usage of trade). 
88 Under the Economic Loss Rule, an injured party may only use tort law to 
recover for personal injury or injury to property other than the goods sold under 
the agreement that led to the alleged harm. The injured party is prohibited from 
recovering in tort the loss in value to the good sold or other purely economic 
damages associated with the sale. See WILLIAM HAWKLAND, ET AL, 1 HAWKLAND 
UCC SERIES § 2-314:6 (2018).  
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injured party might bring a claim in tort rather than contract. Public 
policy behind tort law shifts liability from injured victims to 
tortfeasors with the idea that “a motivated rational tortfeasor will 
reduce potentially harmful activity to the extent that the cost of 
accidents exceeds the benefits of the activity.”89 Two tort claims 
relevant to an AI world are negligent design and strict liability. 
Negligent design focuses on whether the designer failed to exercise 
due care in its design.90 The analysis applies a reasonable person 
standard to determine whether the designer acted reasonably in 
designing a product.91 If a designer acts unreasonably, a court will 
find it negligent. Conversely, strict product liability ignores whether 
the designer acted reasonably and instead focuses on whether the 
product, when it reached consumers, was unreasonably dangerous.92 
To assert a claim under this theory, consumers bear the burden to 
show that: 1) the product underwent no substantial change from its 
manufacture to the time of injury; 2) the consumer used the product 
in a reasonable way; 3) the product caused the consumer’s injury; 
and 4) the product was sold in a defective or unreasonably dangerous 
condition. 93  Strict liability forces manufacturers to ensure that 
products are safe before making them available to the general 
public.  
Following industry customs when designing or making products 
forms strong defenses to negligent design and strict liability. 94 As 
                                                                                                             
89 Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort 
Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018).  
90 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 285 (2008).  
91 Id.  
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); DAVID 
G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1, 23 (3d ed. 2014). 
93  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
94 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 90, at 290-300; see FED. R. EVID. 406 
(customs and routine practices admissible as evidence to prove action in 
conformity); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 12 (2000) 
(describing tort liability as premised on deviation from acceptable standards); see 
also the Frye doctrine and Daubert test which both support the custom 
compliance defense because expert testimony is only admissible when it “has 
gained standing and scientific recognition in the relevant community of experts.” 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (stating that “[w]idespread 
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such, technology industry custom will likely insulate AI developers 
and designers from risk exposure for careless design as current 
industry practice is to “ship now and patch [or repair] later” to gain 
user feedback and speed to market. 95  As Facebook stated in 
response to a 2013 security bug, “[e]ven with a strong team, no 
company can ensure 100% prevention of bugs, and in rare cases we 
don’t discover a problem until it has already affected a person’s 
account.”96 There is evidence that this practice will increase risk to 
humans in human-AI interaction. For example, Amodei identified 
frequent accidents with machine programming and learning 
processes “where a human designer had in mind a certain (perhaps 
informally specified) objective or task, but the system that was 
designed and deployed for that task produced harmful and 
unexpected results.” 97  Amodei also states that “there are many 
concrete open technical problems relating to accident prevention in 
machine learning systems” and that these problems will become 
more prevalent as more autonomous machines are introduced to 
uncontrolled environments.98 Given the above, humanity requires a 
better framework than industry custom to adequately address the 
risk that these accidents present.  
 
IV.   A MORAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE COMPREHENSIVE 
REGULATION 
 
A.  U.S. Regulation 
 
Comprehensive AI regulation will require a balance between 
commercial, legal and societal concerns. As shown above, U.S. 
common law may not adequately mitigate risks associated with AI 
                                                                                                             
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence [of a scientific 
method] admissible.”). 
95 Ilie Ghiciuc, There Is No Such Thing as Bug Free Software, not Even In 
the Big League, THINSLICES (Aug. 23, 2013), 
https://www.thinslices.com/blog/there-is-no-such-thing-as-bug-free-software. 
96 Important Message from Facebook’s White Hat Program, FACEBOOK (Jun. 
21, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/important-
message-from-facebooks-white-hat-program/10151437074840766/. 
97 Amodei, supra note 59, at 21. 
98 Id. 
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development. On the other hand, over-regulation will impede AI 
innovation. For example, W. Kip Viscusi found that when expected 
product liability payouts are high, firms pull back on 
commercializing innovation,99  but found no negative correlation 
between low to moderate liability payouts and innovation.100 Still, 
some companies opt out of innovation altogether to avoid increased 
liability exposure.101 
Proponents of stricter liability argue that technology companies 
should be held to higher liability standards because they are in the 
best position to prevent defects through quality assurance and safety 
protocols.102 Holding companies liable also allows them to spread 
the risk through insurance or by increasing costs to consumers.103 
These proponents further argue that strict liability discourages 
companies from making defective products and assures 
compensation to injured parties because negligence is too difficult 
to prove. 104  Considering the level of economic power and 
commercial sophistication of the most advanced technology 
companies, these arguments have merit. 
As an early overview of the RoboLaw Project put it, “[o]verly 
rigid regulations might stifle innovation, but a lack of legal clarity 
leaves device-makers, doctors, patients and insurers in the dark.”105 
                                                                                                             
99 W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and 
Development, and Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, at 164–66, 174, 182 
(Feb.1993). 
100 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 90, at 307-308; For a discussion of this 
study, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Product Safety Regulation and the Law of 
Torts, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN 
ENVIRONMENT 151 (1994), https://www.nap.edu/read/4768/chapter/19. 
101 Michael J. Wagner, Impact of Product Liability Issues on Innovation, 32 
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 280, 278 (2006). 
102 Lawrence B. Levy & Suzanne Y. Bell, Software Product Liability: 
Understanding and Minimizing the Risks, 5 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 14 (1990) 
(citing Developing a New Set of Liability Rules for a New Generation of 
Technology: Assessing Liability for Computer-Related Injuries in the Healthcare 
Field, 7 COMPUTER/L. J. 517, 530 (1987)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 You, robot?, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/sponsorships/BMC75b/20120901
_techquarterly_verizon.pdf (focusing on human bionic systems regarding 
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Further, from a legal standpoint, centralized governance seems 
to be the most efficient approach. A state-by-state attempt to 
regulate machine development will likely create the same level of 
administrative burden and inconsistency that patchwork 
cybersecurity regulations have created in the U.S.106   
Still further, risks such as the digital divide, social isolation and 
social bias cited above, present a real danger of social inequity and 
harm resulting from human-machine interaction.  
 
B.  European Regulation 
 
The way forward for U.S. law remains unclear, but Germany’s 
approach to regulating machine development is instructive. When 
Germany became the first country to pass comprehensive AV 
legislation in 2017, it also codified ethical imperatives that must be 
embedded in AV design. 107  Those imperatives included 
requirements that AVs cause fewer accidents than human drivers, 
AV must be designed to make choices that cause the least harm to 
human life, and prohibit designs that cause machines to consider 
age, gender, and the physical constitution of humans in their 
decision-making.108 
The European Parliament’s approach is also instructive. It 
promulgated recommendations on AI regulation requiring that 
machines do no harm to humans and obey orders given by humans, 
and proposed “four ethical principles in robotics engineering: 1) 
beneficence (AI should act in the best interests of humans); 2) non-
maleficence (AI should not harm humans); 3) autonomy (human 
interaction with AI should be voluntary); and 4) justice (the benefit 
of AI should be distributed fairly).” 109 
                                                                                                             
prosthesis). 
106 See Michael Bahar et al., An Emerging Patchwork of Cybersecurity 
Rules, LAW360 (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/957355/an-
emerging-patchwork-of-cybersecurity-rules. 
107 Maria Sheahan, Germany Draws Up Rules of Road for Driverless Cars, 
THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-
autonomous-germany/germany-draws-up-rules-of-the-road-for-driverless-cars-
idUSKCN1B31MT. 
108  Id. 
109 See Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law 
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C.  Proposal for The Future: The Asilomar AI Principles 
 
Considering all of the above, U.S. lawmakers should consider a 
comprehensive, centralized framework to encourage smooth and 
cohesive integration of advanced AI and humans. To balance the 
need for adequate regulation without stifling innovation, lawmakers 
should codify overarching principles to guide machine design and 
manufacturing processes. As those activities lead to new 
developments, lawmakers could adopt industry and market-specific 
legislation when certain machines in specific markets reach 
threshold maturity levels and market pervasiveness, similar to the 
introduction of AV laws. We also propose deploying this approach 
from a centralized regulatory regime to avoid the administrative 
burden and complexity of complying with multiple and differing 
state legislation. 
To guide machine design in a way that preserves humanity and 
encourages equity, the Asilomar AI Principles (the “Principles”) 
should be codified as the overarching guidance for AI design and to 
inform specific regulation for particular products, when needed. 
In 2017, the Future of Life Institute developed the Principles as 
a part of the Beneficial AI Conference.110 The Institute proposed the 
Principles to guide the development of machines in a way that would 
guarantee broad social benefits, safety, and the satisfaction of ethical 
concerns.111 The Principles represent the most complete set of AI 
standards established to date, and each Principle represents a 
standard accepted by ninety percent or more of the Beneficial AI 
Conference attendees including high profile and leading AI thought 
leaders, researchers, scientists, entrepreneurs, economists and 
government representatives. 112   
                                                                                                             
Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. RESOL. P8_TA 2015/2103 (INL) 0051 (2017), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0051+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
110 Research Principles: Ethical Guidelines for Artificial Intelligence 
Research, AI-ETHICS, https://ai-ethics.com/research-principles/ (last visited Mar. 
11, 2018). 
111  Id. 
112 Id. 
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According to the Future of Life Institute (2017), the Principles 
have been signed by 1,273 AI/Robotics researchers and 2,541 
others, including the late Stephen Hawking and business mogul Elon 
Musk.113 The Principles are divided into three parts: 1) research 
issues; 2) ethics and values; and 3) longer-term issues.114  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recent developments in science and technology have put AI on 
a trajectory to interact with humans in unprecedented ways. As 
human-AI interaction intensifies, so will associated risks, many of 
which pose threats to humanity. Under current law, liability 
mechanisms to address and mitigate those threats are inadequate and 
put the average consumer at a distinct disadvantage compared to the 
companies in the best position to advance AI. A socio-legal 
perspective is best suited to address that gap as it considers the 
sociological aspects of how human activities are formed and 
organized. In addition, law makers and society at large must strike a 
balance between protecting society, protecting technological 
progress and the economic benefits that could result. Codifying 
underlying guidelines to influence the design of AI for the 
betterment of society through the Asilomar Principles is a great 
place to start.  
                                                                                                             
113 Asilomar AI Principles, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE 
https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
114 Appendix. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The Twenty-three Asilomar Principles115 
 
Research Issues:  
 
1) Research Goal: The goal of AI research should be to create 
not undirected intelligence, but beneficial intelligence. 
  
2) Research Funding: Investments in AI should be 
accompanied by funding for research on ensuring its beneficial use, 
including thorny questions in computer science, economics, law, 
ethics, and social studies.  
 
3) Science-Policy Link: There should be constructive and 
healthy exchange between AI researchers and policy-makers.  
 
4) Research Culture: A culture of cooperation, trust, and 
transparency should be fostered among researchers and developers 
of AI.  
 
5) Race Avoidance: Teams developing AI systems should 
actively cooperate to avoid corner-cutting on safety standards. 
 
 
Ethics and Values: 
 
6) Safety: AI systems should be safe and secure throughout 
their operational lifetime, and verifiably so where applicable and 
feasible.  
 
7) Failure Transparency: If an AI system causes harm, it should 
be possible to ascertain why. 
 
8) Judicial Transparency: Any involvement by an autonomous 
system in judicial decision-making should provide a satisfactory 
explanation auditable by a competent human authority.  
                                                                                                             
115 FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE, supra note 113. 
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9) Responsibility: Designers and builders of advanced AI 
systems are stakeholders in the moral implications of their use, 
misuse, and actions, with a responsibility and opportunity to shape 
those implications.  
 
10)  Value Alignment: Highly autonomous AI systems 
should be designed so that their goals and behaviors can be assured 
to align with human values throughout their operation.  
 
11)  Human Values: AI systems should be designed and 
operated so as to be compatible with the ideals of human dignity, 
rights, freedoms, and cultural diversity. 
 
12) Personal Privacy: People should have the right to access, 
manage and control the data they generate, given AI systems’ power 
to analyze and utilize that data.  
 
13) Liberty and Privacy: The application of AI to personal data 
must not unreasonably curtail people’s real or perceived liberty.  
 
14) Shared Benefit: AI technologies should benefit and 
empower as many people as possible. 
 
15) Shared Prosperity: The economic prosperity created by AI 
should be shared broadly, to benefit all of humanity.  
 
16) Human Control: Humans should choose how and whether to 
delegate decisions to AI systems, to accomplish human-chosen 
objectives.  
 
17) Non-subversion: The power conferred by control of highly 
advanced AI systems should respect and improve, rather than 
subvert, the social and civic processes on which the health of society 
depends.  
 
18) AI Arms Race: An arms race in lethal autonomous weapons 
should be avoided. 
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Longer-term Issues: 
 
19) Capability Caution: There being no consensus, we should 
avoid strong assumptions regarding upper limits on future AI 
capabilities.  
 
20) Importance: Advanced AI could represent a profound 
change in the history of life on earth, and should be planned for and 
managed with commensurate care and resources.  
 
21) Risks: Risks posed by AI systems, especially catastrophic or 
existential risks, must be subject to planning and mitigation efforts 
commensurate with their expected impact.  
 
22) Recursive Self-Improvement: AI systems designed to 
recursively self-improve or self-replicate in a manner that could lead 
to rapidly increasing quality or quantity must be subject to strict 
safety and control measures.  
 
23) Common Good: Superintelligence should only be developed 
in the service of widely shared ethical ideals, and for the benefit of 
all humanity rather than one state or organization (Future of Life 
Institute, 2017). 
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